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PAPER SUBMITTED FOR SPECIAL EDITION OF AAAJ  
CONTEMPORARY PROFESSIONAL WORK: ACCOUNTING AND BEYOND 
 
Industry Analysts – how to conceptualise the distinctive new 
forms of IT Market Expertise?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper explores conceptual issues arising in an empirical study of the emergence 
of a distinctive new form of expertise - of industry analysts and in particular the leading firm 
Gartner Group that exercises enormous influence over the IT market.   
 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper critically reviews existing analytical frameworks 
and especially work from the Sociology of Professions. This has largely focused upon groups 
which have already succeeded in gaining wide acceptance of the effectiveness of their methods 
and knowledge. For emerging expert groups a key challenge is to create an audience for whom 
they are expert (Turner 2001). The study contributes to a ‘third wave’ of studies that shift the 
focus of enquiry from the operation of professional institutions to the conduct of expert work – 
and how knowledge is produced, validated and consumed.  
 
The paper draws upon an extended ethnographic study of Gartner Inc. and other industry 
analysts to characterize some key features of their expertise.  Data sources include over 100 
hours of participant observation of industry analysts and their interactions with vendors and 
technology adopters at IT industry conferences; interviews with over 20 industry analysts from 
Gartner (including a telephone interview with its founder Gideon Gartner) and other analyst 
organisations; a substantial body of interviews with technology vendors and clients (particularly 
in relation to the Customer Relation Management technology sector); together with a review of 
Gartner documentation and reports. 
 
Findings: The paper compares our empirical findings of industry analysts with accounts from 
current literature on management consultants and other groups such as journalists and financial 
analysts. Industry analysts, like consultants, have not sought to follow a classical professional 
model. Thus the brand reputation of big (industry analyst or consultancy) firms provides an 
alternative warrant of the quality of expertise to professional institutions. However Gartner 
analysts identify differences as well as similarities between their work and management 
consultants. Gartner’s ability to rank the offerings of IT vendors requires them to adopt formal 
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methodologies and internal review procedures to produce defensible knowledge and 
demonstrate their independence. Industry analysts need to establish cognitive authority over 
rapidly changing technological fields. This imparts some ‘public good’ elements to their 
knowledge. 
 
Originality/value: The paper suggests ways forward for analysing new forms of knowledge 
intermediary in business and accounting, applying perspectives from the ‘third wave’ of studies, 
and involving detailed study of the ‘epistemic systems’ through which such knowledge is 
produced, consumed and validated (Knorr Cetina 2010). 
 
Introduction  
This paper examines the emergence of a distinctive new form of expert labour – industry 
analysts who provide research for enterprise technology buyers and producers. Over the last 3 
decades they appear to have gained considerable influence over the Information Technology 
(IT) market (Bernard & Gallupe 2013, Author Study forthcoming). Industry analyst research is 
read and acted on by Chief Information Officers (CIOs) planning organisational IT strategies, IT 
procurement teams choosing between multi-million pound workplace IT solutions, and company 
managers and employees wanting to learn more about the potential benefits of digital 
technologies for their business (Firth & Swanson 2005, Burks 2006). Industry analyst output is 
also extensively read by technology vendors and investor analysts (Snapp 2013). They have 
been described (Ikeler 2007: 234) as the “single most influential validators” of IT products and 
services. Foremost amongst these is Gartner Inc. which has emerged ahead of competitors 
such as Computer Intelligence, Dataquest, Forrester, Input, International Data Corporation, 
Ovum and Yankee Group. Its 2013 annual revenue of $US1.784 billion, meant that Gartner was 
6 times larger than its nearest rival Forrester and accounts for about 39% of the industry analyst 
market (Noble 2014). We have studied how Gideon Gartner established this firm and in so 
doing constituted a novel and distinctive model of expert work. This paper considers how we 
may best conceptualise this expertise.   
This paper seeks to explore conceptual issues surrounding the emergence of this distinctive 
new form of expertise that we addressed through an extended ethnographic study of industry 
analysts and in particular the leading firm Gartner Group that exercises enormous influence 
over the IT market. Industry analysts are one of a number of types of knowledge intermediary 
that play a crucial role in the operation of markets including notably security or financial analysts 
(Bessy & Chauvin 2013). We examine how this new role drew upon templates of various kinds 
of financial and other profession. The paper seeks to characterise the how the work of industry 
analysts is conducted and achieves influence. Though this is an under-researched area (Imam 
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and Spence 2015), a number of pathbreaking studies suggest that analysts influence decisions 
by establishing ‘frames’ through which developments in uncertain and rapidly changing markets 
can be viewed (Beunza & Garud 2007). This is particularly in relation to the selection and 
evaluation of complex and novel non-fungible goods whose properties cannot readily be 
established by prior inspection (Bessy & Chauvin 2013). 
We turn initially to the Sociology of Professions, where a substantial body of studies has 
examined how, over the last century, various groups of specialist labour, ranging from social 
workers to technical experts, emulated the mechanisms that had been successfully used by 
scientists, lawyers and medical practitioners to achieve professional status, autonomy and 
rewards. We review this work and focus in particular upon its application to management 
consultants – who do not pursue the typical professional model. We identify similarities and 
important differences between management consultants and industry analysis. We supplement 
this understanding by drawing in approaches from further afield. Scholars from our own field of 
Science and Technology Studies have largely neglected the area of accounting and business 
knowledge (Porter 1992, Akera 2007). There have been important exceptions: notably Shapin 
(2008) and the recent extension of Sociology of Science into the Sociology of Markets (e.g. 
Preda 2009).  
The paper will examine the particular models that informed the emergence of the industry 
analyst role. Specialist occupations seeking to establish professional status need to make 
choices in terms of how their knowledge is produced and applied and how its efficacy is 
established (Mok 1971). Science and medicine constitute one well-established, and culturally 
accepted model. However other models are also available (e.g. of management consultant, 
journalist, financial analyst). We discover that industry analysts drew explicitly upon many of 
these types of expertise in thinking about their roles. Gartner industry analysts emphasise their 
independence and their production of ‘defensible knowledge’, demonstrated through their 
adoption of increasingly formalised methodologies. In this respect they may resemble Porter’s 
(1992) characterisation of business experts (in particular, accountants) as a source of ‘public 
knowledge’ needed “to coordinate the activities of diverse actors, and to lend credibility to forms 
of belief and action when personal trust is in short supply.” (Porter 1992: 640) 
Context of our study 
Our initial exploration of expertise (Author Study 1998) noted the burgeoning number and range 
of specialist fields of knowledge and associated experts. This pattern has continued, unabated, 
into the 21st Century. Growth in the number of experts, and their perceived salience has been 
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accompanied by the proliferation of new kinds of knowledge, including the industry analysts we 
examine here. The increasing complexity of computer-based systems and the search for 
improved organisational performance are just some of the factors seen to drive the growth of 
management consultants and other forms of business expertise. Moreover, ‘lean firm’ 
prescriptions since the 1980s have stressed the economic advantages, indeed competitive 
imperative, of outsourcing many functions, including specialist labour, that might previously 
have been employed by the organisation. The outsourcing process has extended from areas 
seen as outwith the organisation’s ‘core competences’ to include more strategic issues. As a 
result, today most firms must buy-in substantial parts of their technical and change management 
expertise.  
The resort to expertise – to resolve problems of uncertainty of decision-making under contexts 
of incomplete information – in turn creates new uncertainties and knowledge requirements 
(Author Study 1998). In particular, how can organisation managers assess the quality and 
trustworthiness of different experts and the pertinence and utility of their expertise to its 
business challenges? Some degree of knowledge is needed to assess the competing claims of 
different providers of expertise. This dilemma is reflected in the emergence of new classes of 
expert (individuals and organisations) that can offer firms advice on how to select and manage 
their relationship with key strategic suppliers of business knowledge (including providers of 
change management consultancy and of embodied expertise in the form of new technological 
systems). These complex domains and the capacity of experts over these fields are 
characterised by considerable ambiguity and uncertainty (Alvesson 2001). 
The Sociology of Professions 
‘Professionalisation’ has been held out as one way to resolve this problem of resorting to expert 
advice. Professionalisation describes the processes whereby a specialist occupation seeks to 
achieve autonomy/control over the conduct of work and its status/rewards by exercising 
monopoly over the legitimate application of a body of specialist knowledge, “organizable as 
common resources for a body of individuals” (Abbott 1988: 324), to solve client problems. A 
body of research over the last three decades from what has been termed the Sociology of 
Professions has explored the wider uptake of this model, derived from the older professions of 
medicine and law and the sciences. But do these particular conceptions apply to business 
knowledge – and the new forms of expertise, such as industry analysts - that are emerging 
today?  
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Professionalisation as a solution to the problems of expert knowledge  
Professionalisation has long been discussed as a solution to quality problems in occupations 
that require expert knowledge. As Freidson points out: “In any large and complex community 
there must be some conventional ways by which people can identify an expert without having to 
rely on word-of-mouth testimonials, on prior personal experience, or on time- and resource-
consuming, risky, trial employment” (Freidson 1994: 159). Experts by definition possess 
specialised, esoteric knowledge that cannot readily be evaluated by generalists applying 
everyday criteria (Mok 1971, Freidson 1994). Professionalisation provides an institutionalised 
way of ‘attesting expertise’ (Groß & Kieser 2006: 72). As Abbott’s (1988) classic study states:   
Professions were organised bodies of experts who applied esoteric knowledge to particular 
cases. They had elaborate systems of instruction and training together with entry by examination 
and other formal pre-requisites. They normally possessed and enforced a code of ethics or 
behaviour (Abbott 1988: 4).  
This traditional view of professionalisation can be traced back to Carr-Saunders and Wilson’s 
(1934) The Professions. This first generation of writings, informed by the ‘functionalist’ analyses 
of Parsons (1939, 1954) and Merton (1982), highlight the beneficial role of professional 
institutions both, in regulating the behaviour of experts by penalising abuse of expert status and 
opportunistic exploitation of the asymmetrical distribution of knowledge between expert and 
client and in protecting the autonomy of expert judgement from pressures from external political 
and economic pressures from vested interests (e.g. of public administration or commerce). 
Much of the early work of professions, accordingly, was concerned to define and differentiate 
professionals from other occupations through their possession of various attributes (see for 
example Raelin 1989). The various accounts broadly share a set of ‘core defining 
characteristics’ of professions, including: “formal education and entry requirements; a monopoly 
over an esoteric body of knowledge and associated skills; autonomy over the terms and 
conditions of practice; collegial authority; a code of ethics; and, commitment to a service ideal” 
(Anleu 1992: 24). Though professional behaviour was initially seen to be rooted in conceptions 
of ‘gentlemanly’ behaviour, this definition of professionalism has become overtaken by the 
medical/scientific model (Fournier 2000).  
The second generation in the Sociology of Professions  
From the 1970s a radical critique emerged of this view - which became characterised as the 
‘functionalist’ account - and the privileged status it accorded to professional expertise (Brante 
1988). Thus Freidson (1970), one of the earliest contributions to what we might call the ‘second 
wave’ in the analysis of professions, criticised (in the case of medicine) the prevalent 
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functionalist theories of professions as “scientifically-based, practically-efficacious, and socially 
altruistic” (Coburn 1992: 497). Larson (1977) in particular revisits Weber’s idea that professional 
groups exercise social closure to advance their interests. Her concept of ‘professional project’ 
highlighted the strategies for sectional occupational advancement accompanying 
professionalism. Notwithstanding the diversity of currents in the Sociology of Professions, most 
of these, in reaction against the functionalist account, share an emphasis on how expert 
communities exercise social closure – to gain authority over an area of expert knowledge and to 
exclude others - in order to increase rewards and, crucially, to achieve autonomy/control over 
the exercise of their work (Groß and Kieser 2006). In similar terms, Freidson (1994) argues that 
professionalisation seeks to retain control over the definition, organisation, execution and 
evaluation of its activities. This encompasses control over who has the right to produce certain 
services (and how such rights are acquired) and how those services are produced (Muzio et al. 
2011).  
Here perhaps the most fully articulated contribution is Abbott’s (1988) dynamic analysis of 
professionalisation as an interactive system. Expertise is not exercised by expert groups in 
isolation; the professionalisation project takes place in an ecology of professions. Abbott 
highlights competition within and between different professional groups - which take the form of 
‘jurisdictional conflicts’. Abbott’s work has been highly influential over subsequent debates and it 
is helpful to review his framework. 
Abbott’s analysis explores the activities that need to be controlled in order for the profession to 
stay in command over its jurisdiction: the classification (e.g. in medicine, diagnosis), reasoning 
(e.g. inference) and remedying (e.g. treatment) of a problem. Across these three activities, 
jurisdictional control is maintained through legitimation, research and instruction. 
Abbott highlights internal stratification within a profession – the development of vertical divisions 
of knowledge and status – with some more routine tasks being delegated to lower status groups 
and perhaps ejected from a profession. At the upper end of the spectrum, he draws attention to 
professional regression. Issues of expert judgement - both matters of substantive controversy 
and questions regarding the expert status of particular practitioners - are referred to members of 
the field with the highest status. The elite of the field become internalised within the profession 
and socially and linguistically distanced from clients.  
Central to Abbott’s analysis is the concept of jurisdictional work: in their labour, professionals 
encounter members of other groups and take part in various kinds of boundary work and 
conflicts for authority with other professional groups. Abbott’s dynamic model highlights a 
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strategic dilemma facing professional groups – rigid professional organisation facilitates 
validation of claims in competition with other groups but conversely limits flexibility of 
professional groups to colonise other problem areas. One corollary is that in areas where there 
is constant change in the domain of practice and thus of knowledge it may be infeasible to 
establish professional structures around recognized bodies of knowledge needed to validate 
experts’ status, performance and knowledge claims. Abbott discusses the systematization of 
knowledge – and how this may vary according to the insertion of a profession into the wider 
system of professionalisation. For Abbott, a systematised, formalised and codified knowledge 
base may be viewed as an outcome as well as a prerequisite for professional action (Muzio et al 
2011) – a point we return to below in relation to business knowledge.  
Professionalisation seen as competing with alternative forms of structuring expertise 
With their focus on established professional models, this ‘second generation’ of writings 
frequently portrays professionalisation as competing with alternative forms of structuring 
expertise. Various writers in the Sociology of Professions address the challenges to the 
professional model and the possibility of alternate forms of structuring expertise. 
Professionalisation is by no means the only model for organising expert labour; nor is its 
success guaranteed. Thus Abbott (1988: 324) argues that “we have professionalization … 
because competing forms of institutionalization have not yet overwhelmed it … 
Professionalism…competes with alternate forms of structuring expertise, in particular, with 
commodification and organisation”. Freidson (1994) offers a similar formulation, portraying 
professionalisation as competing with markets and bureaucracy: professionals seek autonomy 
rather than being subject to the dictat of consumers in the market or managers in public 
administration and large corporations (Groß & Kieser 2006, Muzio et al. 2011). 
Abbott (1988) analyses the competition between professionalism and commodification. This:  
arises in part because the commodities embodying expertise require development, maintenance 
and support that increasingly exceed the resources of individual professionals. The commercial 
organisations and governments that invest in commodified professional knowledge compete 
directly for client fees with professionals, whether the commodities provide services directly or are 
simply used by professionals in practice…But nonprofessionals increasingly own and operate 
professional commodities, which makes the present more dangerous to the idea of 
professionalism itself (Abbott 1988: 324). 
Control over the production of commodified knowledge by large commercial organisations is 
seen thereby to threaten the professional model in which knowledge is “organizable as common 
resources for a body of individuals” (Abbott 1988: 324). These challenges posed to established 
models of professionalisation were seen as likely to both limit the autonomy of professional work 
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and to restrict the growth of the professional form of expert labour (Coburn 1992, Evetts 2006). 
Fournier (2000: 68) draws attention to some of the inconsistencies in these debates – for 
example some portray the ‘logic of the market’ as leading to “a ‘corruption’ of professional 
practice” (i.e. a loss of autonomy) whilst others see it as “intensifying the bureaucratic trend 
towards the commodification of professional knowledge”. These discourses often unhelpfully 
counterpose professionalism to competitive economic and political systems (thus Freidson’s 
[1994] classic early work portrays professionalism as the ‘Third Logic’ alongside market and 
bureaucracy). Rather than counterposing self-interest and rationalistic altruism, as in the 
Weberian tradition, Dingwall (2008: 2) following Parsons, proposes that both are 
interpenetrated, and that the capitalist economy and the professions/the rational socio-legal 
order they point to are both historical products of modern society. 
These challenges to the professions figure in recent writings on health, welfare and social 
services and education. Here a range of specialist occupations has, it seems, sought to extend 
the established model of professional work, derived as we have seen from medicine, science 
and law, to various other kinds of specialist work – and especially to delivering certified quality 
of service in various public services and statutorily required functions. There have of course 
been important shifts in the character of professions in this period. When theories of profession 
first emerged, medics, for example, were independent practitioners, or partners/employees in 
small partnerships. This model continues in general practice in the UK and elsewhere but has 
disappeared from hospital medicine which is provided by large public or private organisations. 
Today’s professionals are frequently employees – some provide services as labour only sub-
contractors – e.g. change management or technology implementation consultants, but more 
generally they are employed by larger service organisations or as specialist functions providing 
those services to larger organisations. 
Here social scientists have examined professional organisation as a source of resistance to 
commercialisation pressures and other reorganisation and rationalisation efforts – in particular 
those arising in the recent period from ‘New Public Management’ initiatives. Writers in this 
category appear to revert to elements of the functionalist analysis through their identification 
with the traditional professional model coupled with an often unacknowledged normative 
commitment towards its ‘public good’ features, in terms of the protection it appears to offer 
against external pressures. Under this model, expertise, professionally regulated, encourages 
self-discipline, protecting clients from the risk of being exploited/ensuring quality of service and 
protecting the autonomy and rewards for professionals in their work (Brante 1988, Fournier 
Resubmission 
9 
 
2000).1 This model of expertise seems to provide a solution to the problem of resorting to expert 
advice. But do these particular conceptions, derived from the older professions of medicine and 
law and the sciences, apply to business knowledge – and the new forms of expertise that are 
emerging today.  
The professionalisation of business knowledge 
There is a substantial body of research into another, already well-established group deploying 
business knowledge: management consultants. This work has examined the applicability of the 
analysis of professionalisation to management and systems consultants and other business 
knowledge experts (McKenna 2006). The number of managerial consultants has grown rapidly - 
by over 10% per year over the last three decades (Groß and Kieser 2006). Public and private 
organisations are today spending large sums of money on external consultants. They buy-in 
expertise that they do not possess from a range of Professional Service Firms and individual 
consultants. But how can they identify the most trustworthy experts? This state of affairs has 
been described as ‘ideal grounds for professionalising the consulting industry’ (Groß and Kieser 
2006: 71) as this provides a means to protect clients and fellow consultants from poor quality 
advice.  
However writers from the Sociology of Professions have highlighted the extent to which 
management consultants and other information occupations have failed (Abbott 1988) or, more 
particularly, have not sought to achieve (Groß and Kieser 2006, Muzio et al. 2011) professional 
status in the sense described above. Thus Abbott (1988: 245), considering computing 
occupations and the other expert labour involved in developing and maintaining Management 
Information Systems (MIS) notes that, “[n]o coherent set of people has in fact emerged to take 
jurisdiction in this area. It continues to be extremely permeable, with most training on the job, 
most expertise readily commodifiable and careers following wildly diverging patterns”. 
Instead, Abbott (1988) notes the emergence and dominance of large inter-professional 
organisations that supply contractual services. He attributes their success to their efficiency in 
making available and integrating the range of specialist knowledge and experience needed to 
develop and implement computer systems: 
…new social structures offering these information resources more efficiently…large scale 
consulting services that install complete information systems for corporate clients have become 
common only in the last 2 decades. Like many such areas this one was invaded by organisations 
whose common property was their ability to field the multiprofessional teams necessary...” 
(Abbott 1988: 244). 
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These MIS providers mainly arose from the large international consulting houses, which, in turn, 
were often based upon the (then Big 8) large international accounting firms. So here we see an 
alternative to the classic professionalization model based on the ability of these large 
organisations to deploy multiple kinds of expertise, often constituted through internal training, 
rather than externally validated training and certification. Abbott (1988) observes that these 
groups may achieve a certain professionalisation “in the sense of creating a coherent 
occupational group with some control of an abstract expertise” (Ibid: 154). However, their 
internal structure differs from that of conventional professions like medicine and law: “They are 
much less committed to rigid definition of jurisdiction or membership, since they must be flexible 
enough to move in directions that enable organizational survival” (Idem.). 
Groß and Kieser (2006) analyse how these big consultancy organisations resolve potential 
uncertainties about the capability of their experts through reputational indicators (Glückler and 
Armbrüster 2003, Armbrüster and Glückler, 2007)). This is foremost by establishing (as a proxy 
indicator of past performance) and maintaining (as a promise for clients and incentive for 
consultants regarding their future performance) their corporate brand (Alvesson 2001, 
Armbrüster 2006, Groß & Kieser 2006, Muzio et al. 2011). Perceptions about their capacity to 
resolve client problems is in turn supported by:  
i) developing distinctive change management concepts (Fincham 1995, Kipping & 
Armbrüster 2000, Groß & Kieser 2006),  
ii) emphasising the selectivity of their recruiting processes as a guarantee of 
individual capacity (only the best get in and are retained) (Groß and Kieser 2006, 
Greenwood et al 2005), and  
iii) emphasising the extensive experience of their consultants in resolving problems 
with other clients – exemplified by the number of successful cases they had been 
involved in (Groß & Kieser 2006) which becomes a kind of currency for valuing 
expertise (Heusinkveld & Benders 2005). 
We note that whilst traditional professional certification provides assurance of a requisite 
standard of performance, these proxies for quality give potential clients something else: a way 
to identify the best service providers who might help them achieve competitive advantage.   
The alleged ‘failure’ of the professionalisation project in management knowledge has been 
attributed variously to the lack of state regulation of expert status (Groß & Kieser 2006, Muzio et 
al. 2011),2 the consequent low barriers to entry (Glucker & Armbrüster 2003), the variety of 
areas encompassed (IT, management, accounting [Muzio et al. 2011]) which is seen to favour 
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large firms able to deploy both the broad range of expertise and the skills in managing 
interdisciplinary teams. The latter points are also seen to underpin the strength of large 
management consultancy organisations. However, as Muzio et al. (2011: 818) point out: 
In these areas, unlike in the case of the traditional professions, large firms have predated and 
subsequently constrained the development of professional institutions. Firms themselves became 
the main locus of professional closure and regulation, shaping the development of this field and 
determining, to a large extent, the status and material conditions of practitioners (Muzio et al. 
2011: 818). 
Consultants thus seem to have been prevented from sustaining a traditional professionalisation 
project – or perhaps more importantly, they may have opted out as they did not need it. The 
success of these firms in validating knowledge through their standing in the market – meant that 
the larger firms had little need for external professionalisation institutions to validate their 
expertise – and there is some evidence that they inhibited the development of professional 
institutions (Groß & Kieser 2006, Whittington et al. 2011). “Consultants have been able to 
establish themselves as widely acknowledged and sufficiently trusted experts. They have done 
so without professionalization in the traditional sense” (Groß & Kieser 2006: 92–3) [of resorting 
to formal professional associations].   
The apparent ‘failure’ of professionalisation in the area of business knowledge can also be 
understood in terms of the character and distribution of the expertise involved. Whilst the 
traditional professionalisation strategy revolved around the possession of a systematised, 
abstract knowledge base, some have suggested that “consulting knowledge is too elusive, fuzzy 
and perishable to sustain a traditional professionalization project” (Muzio el al. 2011: 807). More 
pertinently, the need for business knowledge to be implemented and prove useful for particular 
organisational clients perhaps limits the abstraction of knowledge (generic models have to be 
translated to meet particular client needs). Change management knowledge thus revolves 
around a combination of generic and specific knowledge, of formal knowledge and practical 
experience (Kipping & Armbrüster 2000, Werr & Stjernberg 2003, Sturdy et al. 2009, Whittington 
et al. 2011). As Werr and Stjernberg (2003) note, management consultancy, as a knowledge 
system, involves a distinctive combination of theoretical and practical knowledge: “knowledge as 
practice…generated, maintained and accumulated through action in a specific context…tightly 
linked to a specific context and person, its accumulation is dependent on individual 
actors…continual development of shared understandings among a group of actors sharing a 
practice” (Werr and Stjernberg 2003: 884). Kipping and Armbrüster (2000) similarly highlight the 
tension that therefore arises between circulation and implementation of managerial knowledge. 
Rather than offering universal solutions, firms want to validate the particular utility of their 
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specific approaches embodied in proprietary methodologies and a distinctive brand (Armbrüster 
2006, Muzio et al 2011). These paradoxical features of business knowledge work against the 
professional model (Muzio et al 2011).  
These arguments would seem to have particular pertinence to the case currently under 
examination (e.g., knowledge of the IT applications domain). Knowledge of these domains is 
extensive and heterogeneous, reflecting the variety both of technology solutions and of (sectoral 
and organisational) application contexts. As a result, it is hard to codify and generalise it into the 
kind of ‘abstract knowledge base’ that could be appropriated, deployed and certified by a 
traditional professional organisation. This knowledge is moreover under constant, and arguably 
accelerating, change as a result of the dynamism of the IT solution markets and of the 
strategies of their organisational users. Abbott (2005: 254) sees this as a key factor in the 
“failure of the ‘information profession’ to emerge as a stable and effective actor in the ecology of 
professions, despite the massive importance of information work in the current economy. The 
blunt fact is that knowledge turns over too fast for a real information profession to emerge”. 
Rather different solutions to the circulation and validation of these kinds of knowledge may be 
called for. We will return to this key question of the temporality of knowledge which is an 
important factor in understanding differences in epistemic systems between scientists, financial 
analysts and industry analysts.  
Do these models apply to industry analyst expertise? 
Many of these arguments about management consultants would seem also to apply to industry 
analysts. For example we do not find the model of stratification and professional regression 
anticipated by the Sociology of Professions whereby disputes about performance are referred to 
a segregated professional elite. There is stratification (i.e. reputational differentiation) within the 
expert community but this takes place within the analyst organisations. And the elite of the field 
are not distanced from clients; quite the reverse, they become client facing ‘stars’ (see Author 
Study 2015). 
Moreover, it seems that these analysts do not need professional associations to validate their 
knowledge. Instead, reputational indicators and above all the brand of the analyst organisation 
becomes a key proxy for quality of expertise (the ‘quality’ of the staff the firm employs, the 
‘rigour’ of the methodologies they deploy etc.). There are thus striking differences between 
traditional professions and industry analysts like Gartner. In many respects, analysts exhibit 
many similarities with management consultants. However, as our empirical study shows below, 
industry analysts distinguish themselves from management consultants. Indeed they proved 
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very keen to draw explicit comparisons, identifying differences and similarities between their 
expert role and that of consultants, academic researchers, journalists and others.  
This draws our attention most immediately to the choices that expert groups need to make in 
terms of how their knowledge is produced and applied. As Mok (1971: 109) observes, “Every 
profession’s members are confronted with the necessity of choosing a role model”. Mok 
suggests that particular professions adopt distinctive combinations, which then become 
institutionalised, of producing knowledge and applying knowledge to solve the problems of a lay 
clientele, with a current tendency towards the latter given the potential credibility and financial 
rewards of meeting client needs. Abbott (1988) notes how in making these choices, groups may 
seek to draw upon culturally legitimated modes of practice, and, particularly over the last 
century, upon the scientific model. The empirical analysis will focus upon how industry analysts 
conceptualise their expertise and the strategic choices that Gideon Gartner made in designing 
this new form of expertise. 
The observation raises questions about how relevant conceptual frameworks from the Sociology 
of Professions are for management consultancy and a range of other new expert occupations 
that are subject to very different sets of exigencies/forms of validation. Here we find important 
insights from an apparent convergence between recent insights from the Sociology of 
Professions and Sociology of Science which point to a third wave of analysis. 
New approaches: a third wave of Sociology of Professions and expertise  
The Sociology of Professions took as its starting point the classic historical professions - 
medicine, religion and law etc. - seen as a template for analysing the wider spread of 
professionalisation. This approach has, arguably, unhelpfully skewed analysis of expertise and 
professional work. It has tended to draw a gulf between professions and other specialist 
occupations (and their strategies to attain expert status) even though these share many 
common characteristics (Evetts 2006). Various writers, noting this, have argued that classical 
professionalisation should be seen as just one strategy of occupational power (Fincham 2006, 
Muzio et al. 2011).   
The undue focus of the Sociology of Professions on professional institutions and their role in 
establishing closure has, we argue, held back understanding of the evolving landscape of expert 
work. It is something of a paradox that, with its focus on social control mechanisms (e.g. 
jurisdictional competition, closure and boundary work), the Sociology of Professions has paid 
rather little attention to the actual content of professional work and the knowledge(s) involved. 
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As Eyal (2013: 870) observes, “the sociology of professions has been primarily a sociology of 
experts and has had comparatively little to say about expertise”.   
This critique has informed recent discussions both of new models of professionalisation and of 
new frameworks for analysing the emergence of these new kinds of expert labour. Though 
some have sought “modify theories of professionalization so that they effectively come to grips 
with changes in expert work that have occurred in recent times” (Groß and Kieser 2006: 93), 
others suggest that these traditional concepts are not capable of comprehensively explaining 
the expert status of such “new professions” like consultants (Groß and Kieser 2006: 92–3). A 
‘third wave’ of scholars have argued for a shift of the focus of enquiry away from professional 
institutions towards:  
1. detailed examination of expert work and the processes by which expert status is 
achieved (Anderson-Gough et al. 2006; Groß and Kieser 2006;  Evetts 2006; Eyal 
2013); and, 
2. more concrete investigation of the particular contexts, actor configurations and 
contingencies surrounding expertise formation. These include “the wider historical 
context of professions and the role of other key actors, such as the state, employing 
organizations and competing groups in shaping their development” (Muzio el al 2011: 
807) as well as the networks through which new professionals achieve and demonstrate 
professional competence (Anderson-Gough et al. 2006).  
Thus Eyal (2013: 871) calls for a Sociology of Expertise (rather than of professions) that 
addresses how tasks are conducted as well as how jurisdictional boundaries are established: “a 
full explication of expertise must explore indeed this background of practices and the social, 
material, spatial, organizational, and conceptual arrangements that serve as its conditions of 
possibility”.  
Colleagues applying perspectives from the Sociology of Science, in particular to financial 
markets have followed a similar pragmatic turn. Preda (2009), analysing the emergence of a 
body of expert financial knowledge, insists that: “An account of the constitutions of jurisdiction 
should start from the content of this expert knowledge and its generation” (Preda 2009: 150). 
Issues of how to validate expert knowledge arise also in the absence of the social structures of 
professionalization (i.e. with groups that have not yet achieved cognitive authority). Homologous 
considerations arise when we examine these other forms of expertise as have been found in 
relation to established (e.g. techno-scientific) expertise. Preda (2009) for example studies the 
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emergence of a body of expert financial knowledge (‘Chartists’) - who offered investment advice 
based on the “technical analysis” of charts of movements in share and other prices - in the 
absence of professional or quasi-professional structures in relation to these experts. Preda’s 
discussion of “chartism as expert knowledge” (Preda 2009: 153) drawing, like ourselves, on the 
Sociology of Professions and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, is a particularly interesting 
template for us to build on.  
Here Preda turns to Turner’s (2001) typology which differentiates experts in terms of their 
legitimacy with target audiences. We have also found Turner’s typology of experts helpful, 
particularly in clarifying the establishment of cognitive authority - a question that is at the heart 
of our enquiry. 
Turner’s typology of experts 
Turner (2001) argues that: “Expertise is a kind of possession, certified or uncertified, of 
knowledge that is testified to be efficacious and in which this testimony is widely accepted by 
the relevant audience” (ibid: 130). Turner notes that studies of (professional or scientific) 
expertise have tended to focus upon established expert groups like physicists - groups which 
can draw on credibility that has already been established amongst its wider as well as more 
immediate audiences. They already achieved ‘legitimate cognitive authority’ (ibid: 131); the 
efficacy of their knowledge base and methods are widely accepted. For such experts, which 
Turner calls ‘Type I experts’, recognition is a corporate achievement: “this corporate authority 
has achieved a particular kind of legitimation, legitimation not only beyond the sect of physicists, 
but acceptance that is more or less universal” (ibid: 131). However, as he observes, this begs 
the key question: “How did cognitive authorities establish their authority in the first place? And 
how do they sustain this?” (ibid: 130). “Establishing cognitive authority to a general audience is 
not easy”. In the case of physicists, it was major achievements “like nuclear weapons…and new 
technology [that were] the coin of the realm” (ibid: 133). 
Turner notes (ibid: 130) (speaking of Sociology of Science, though the argument also applies to 
the Sociology of Professions) that “these literatures have generally ignored…the problem of the 
origin of authority” because they have largely directed attention to those groups which have 
already established a systematized, formalized and codified knowledge base and for which 
‘legitimate cognitive authority’ has already been achieved (Turner 2001: 130-1). Turner 
develops a typology in terms of the legitimacy experts have established with their audiences.3  
His category of Type 3 experts focuses attention on groups who have not yet established wide 
recognition.  
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Preda sees his Chartists as belonging to the 3rd group in Turner’s schema. Lacking an 
established audience for their work, they had to go about actively creating it: 
users were configured as depending upon a body of specialized knowledge which they cannot 
obtain by themselves, and as needing experts in the interpretation of price movements… 
unbiased judgment. At the same time the technological apparatuses on which this knowledge 
depends are represented as requiring special skills and powers of interpretation which brokers, 
being too busy, have not developed (Preda 2009: 163). 
As well as “establishing control over arcane knowledge” by claiming “epistemic monopoly” over 
their “observational apparatus” these groups claimed that user judgment depended upon their 
services (Preda 2009: 163). A paradox arises here because expertise is believed to be effective, 
but is not completely accessible to outsiders. As Turner (2001) notes: “it is the character of 
expertise that only other experts may be persuaded by argument of the truth of the claims of the 
expert” (ibid: 129).  Achieving expert status thus required demonstration of the efficacy of that 
knowledge. Chartists had to persuade “brokers and investors alike that [this new knowledge] 
was indispensable” (ibid: 153). Preda points out (at least) two elements to this process. This 
includes “the successful persuasion of users that they need a special form of knowledge in their 
activities” (ibid: 152) and building up a following also meant “controlling the distribution of this 
expert knowledge and making it more difficult to access” (ibid., 162). Preda’s historical study 
provides a rich account of how his Chartists were able to create their own following. For 
example by publishing papers and books, they created a ‘tradition’ that legitimated their 
activities. In addition, Preda notes as important their circulation of various tools and devices – 
such as stock price charts or ticker tape machines – which together constituted a distributed 
‘socio-material apparatus’ (Beunza and Stark 2004) that would reconfigure the work of 
stockbrokers. Working with this apparatus was not a supplementary but key aspect of what 
those employed in stock markets from then on did. He discusses how the ‘price ticker’ produced 
a constant flow of prices such that it reconstituted stockbrokers’ practices:  
The ticker transformed the character of price data: a continuous flow of data replaced the rather 
unsystematic price lists. Trust was shifted from idiosyncratic knowledge of transaction partners to 
a machine which could travel across social contexts. New modes of attention and observation 
were introduced, which brought individuals together into price monitoring activities, in public 
places (Preda 2009: 25). 
With the introduction of these technologies, the importance of the outputs of the Chartists 
became central. Preda (2009) describes how those working in stock markets switched from 
observing markets to observing ‘the tape’. 
Whilst the Sociology of Professions has tended to focus upon established, Type 1 experts (in 
Turner’s typology), industry analysts exemplify a rather different kind of expertise, resembling 
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most closely Turner’s 3rd type of expert that need to create an audience for whom they are 
expert. These are “groups and individuals who create their own following” (2001: 145) because 
they have “proven themselves to this audience by their actions” (Turner 2001: 131). Here 
Gartner in particular managed to establish cognitive authority over a number of strategic IT 
markets and especially enterprise systems solutions. 
Methodology 
This paper draws upon extensive ethnographic research conducted over a period of over a 
decade. We obtained early insights into the importance of Gartner Inc. in a previous, extended 
investigation into the development, procurement, implementation and maintenance of enterprise 
systems (Author Study 2009). Building upon this earlier research we were able to apply 
snowball methods to build a wide sample of contacts with industry analysts and other players 
allowing us to view industry analysts from a number of different perspectives. These 
respondents proved remarkably willing to discuss their work and to facilitate further exchanges. 
In this way we were able to gain detailed insights into how industry analysts carried out their 
work. This encompassed ways in which industry analysts acquired information in detailed 
interaction with vendors and adopters, produced assessments of the market and presented 
these outputs to clients. 
There were four main sources of data for this paper. First, observing industry analysts at a 
number of IT forums and conferences, where we conducted over 100 hours of participant 
observation, which in addition provided opportunities for informal discussions and to observe 
their structured and unstructured interactions with vendors and technology adopters. Secondly, 
we conducted formal interviews with over 20 industry analysts from Gartner (including a 
telephone interview with its founder Gideon Gartner) and other analyst organisations. Third, we 
were able to draw upon a substantial body of interviews with technology vendors and clients 
(particularly in relation to the Customer Relation Management technology sector). Finally we 
had access to Gartner documentation and reports (some of which were available freely on the 
internet and others which were sent to us by the above players).  
We transcribed and coded the analyst interviews until we had reached saturation (i.e. no further 
topics arose; absence of disconfirming observations). For reasons of brevity we only present a 
small part of our empirical material here. For a more complete account see Author Study (in 
press).  
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How Industry analysts characterised their expertise 
How industry analysts distinguish themselves from management consultants 
We have already noted some of the similarities between industry analysts and management 
consultants. There is of course substantial overlap in the areas of expertise and experience 
deployed by analysts and IT consultants. Their career paths may overlap (many analysts were 
once consultants for instance). And industry analyst organisations may provide consultancy 
services – for example in advising technology adopters in the course of their technology 
procurement or advising a vendor on product development strategy. However analysts from 
Gartner and other larger analyst organisations will often go to great lengths to distinguish 
themselves from management consultants. Indeed, they portray these consultants as 
consumers of their research. Thus Gartner analyst, Winter, observed that the big consultancy 
firms “are not competitors, they are clients…Most of the research that they [need] they will get it 
from us” (interview, Winter). The core of Gartner’s business is its research base.  
Independence 
Gartner analysts also distinguish themselves from consultants on the basis of their 
independence. Thus Gartner analyst Elias Thomas observes how the big consultants are 
dependent on securing particular contracts: “they will say that we’ll give you independent 
advice. And we will say no you won’t. Because they have got to pay for a whole load of 
consultants to keep them busy. We are paid to give advice and we get very, very upset if that 
independence is questioned” (interview, Thomas). 
Gartner analysts in contrast strenuously emphasise their independence. Protecting their 
reputation for independence profoundly shapes the methods used by analysts and the character 
of industry analyst expertise. The independence of large industry analyst firms like Gartner is 
rooted in their large client base, and in particular on the subscription based services (e.g. for 
technical reports and advisory services) they provide to large numbers of organisations: “The 
largest of the firms work on a syndicated research basis. So they try and have 80% of their 
revenue coming from repeatable annuity based subscriptions that you buy access to” (interview, 
Mitchell).  
Public knowledge? 
Despite some similarities with the big management consultancies - for example, in terms of the 
reputational role of corporate brand - the distinctive model of industry analyst expertise 
established by Gideon Gartner was rather different from the existing management consultancy 
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firms. The expertise of Gartner analysts was not couched simply in terms of the efficacy of their 
advice for particular clients – but also revolved around their ability to produce a wide range of 
outputs that assessed prospects across entire technical fields. This included:  
  identifying and giving a ‘name’ to emerging technical fields;  
 constructing and defending ‘signature’ tools like the Magic Quadrant (a graphical 
ranking);  
In naming a field, for instance, industry analysts are conducting a very specific form of work. 
They are as one analyst described to us ‘drawing a starting line’ that everyone else lines up 
behind (interview, Thomas). These kinds of naming interventions, in theory, could emerge from 
academics or could be attempted by vendors, individually or in collaboration. However, as Elias 
Thomas from Gartner observed, “they don’t have the clout in their own right to name ‘that’ 
because they haven’t got the independence to be able to, unless they are so huge that they 
dictate, determine what the market is called. But that is rare” (interview, Thomas). This ‘third 
party’ role highlights ways in which Gartner’s knowledge outputs exhibit some elements of a 
‘public good’. Gartner expertise would therefore appear to correspond to Porter’s (1992) 
conception (in the case of accountancy) of public knowledge with the credibility needed to 
coordinate action of diverse actors in a context where personal trust is in short supply in the 
face of the competing claims of vested interests. Though targeted towards the technology 
adopters, their assessments help shape emerging application markets, including both the 
procurement choices of adopters and vendors’ development strategies. Industry analysts 
though often controversial, are highly influential.  
We are doing that for the users. The vendors then go ‘great. That is where we are going. Boom. 
We’re an ERP vendor’. They do it because they can see that we have drawn a box around a 
market that they are slap right bang in the middle of and they feel that can dominate it or have a 
serious part to play (interview, Thomas). 
Defensible knowledge  
Given these potentially crucial consequences, and in particular the potentially immediate 
implications for the sales prospects of vendors, and the consequent threat of lawsuit, Gartner 
Inc. may need to be able to defend their claims. Their knowledge outputs must be defensible. 
Here our research has drawn attention to the increasingly elaborate and formal methodologies 
used by Gartner for the production of key knowledge outputs like its Magic Quadrant, together 
with increasingly systematic internal regulation within Gartner of the production of these public 
outputs, which go through an internal ‘peer review’ process (interview, Lehman). 
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Gartner also developed elaborate mechanisms to maintain, and visibly demonstrate, corporate 
regulation of quality and independence of research. Its methods of knowledge production and 
governance drew some elements from the scientific/technical model of expertise. Though 
resembling the procedures of conventional technical specialists or medical and scientific 
professionals, they also differ in some striking ways. For example, we were told by those we 
interviewed of Gartner’s early ‘think tank’ culture (interview, Levin). The debate that goes on 
internally within Gartner’s research teams bears some resemblance to academic review 
systems. Gartner outputs are today increasingly subject to internal quality control (e.g. through 
standardised methods and review by colleagues within the firm). However, review remains 
internal to the analyst organisation: we do not find the external peer review or scrutiny by a 
certificating professional body that characterises traditional professional communities or 
underpins the verification of scientific knowledge. 
Pseudo-academic 
Analysts themselves drew our attention to these similarities but also to differences from 
technical or scientific expertise. They describe their knowledge production as similar to science - 
involving a ‘truth element’ - but different: as pseudo-academic rather than scientific. This was 
expressed by Elias Thomas: 
Ok, we are paid by our company to do our job, but we are, there is a sort of, maybe it is an IT 
industry thing possibly, it is sort of a righteousness element to it. In other words, a sort of search 
for the truth. OK, we are paid to write research in that I am paid to do enquires and I am paid to 
help the client and we get rated on how well the client is happy with our advice. But at the heart of 
it there is a sort of truth element to it (interview, Thomas). 
Whilst Gartner’s presentations may emphasise the pursuit of truth, in their work industry 
analysts prefer a more nuanced account. Gartner analyst Andrew White observes that users 
look to them for ‘truth’. Industry analysts who might be more comfortable with a formulation of “a 
commonly agreed and accepted set of truths that operate as a foundation, on which we will 
each derive our own, interpreted contextually centric views” find this not to be a very marketable 
phrase, so we all tend to use “single version of the truth” (White 2014).  
Cognitive authority 
Here Gartner Inc. in particular managed to establish cognitive authority over a number of 
strategic IT markets and especially enterprise systems solutions. Their cognitive authority is 
sustained not through the operation of a wider professional community (for example through 
external peer review of their knowledge outputs) but with the reputation associated with the 
Gartner brand. We noted the emphasis within Gartner Inc. upon internal quality control and 
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visible warranties of Gartner’s impartiality: quality control resides with the brand rather than a 
broader professional community. As James Governor CEO of the analyst organisation Red 
Monk observed: 
analysts are not even professionals, not in the strict sense of the word that we sort of understand 
in this country at least. You are not a professional until you have done at least seven years of 
study. There is no equivalent of that in the analyst business. You can come from any background. 
And really in some sense an analyst business is just something that certifies people as able to be 
analysts (interview, Governor). 
And what is at stake here differs subtly from the means by which scientific veracity is 
established through the acceptance of knowledge claims across a scientific community amongst 
whom there is broad consensus about criteria and methods by which the quality and validity of 
knowledge can be assessed. The key test of Gartner’s expertise is not the enduring truth of its 
knowledge claims but its utility value. The advice analysts’ offer is assessed in terms of its 
perceived relevance for client organisations needing to make decisions (and their willingness to 
renew subscriptions). Though Gartner Inc. sells its services to technology vendors and 
investors, it foregrounds (and reserves the term client for) technology adopters seeking to 
assess different supplier claims.  
Strategic choices underpinning the distinctive form of Industry analysis expertise 
We have explored the strategic choices pursued in particular by Gideon Gartner that 
underpinned the emergence of this new category of expert. Though the methods of knowledge 
production employed by industry analysts embody some elements that resemble conventional 
technical specialists, they also differ in some striking ways. For example, our research has 
drawn attention to the increasingly elaborate and formal methodologies used by Gartner for the 
production of key knowledge outputs like its Magic Quadrants, together with increasingly 
systematic internal regulation within Gartner of the production of these public outputs, which go 
through an internal ‘peer review’ process (Author Study 2009). Though these may resemble the 
knowledge creation and governance systems of medical and scientific professionals, the 
analysts themselves describe their knowledge production as pseudo-academic rather than 
scientific (interview, Thomas). Thus Gartner outputs are subject to internal quality control within 
the firm (e.g. through standardised methods and internal review) rather than the peer review by 
the external professional community that underpins the verification of scientific knowledge. We 
see these features as closely linked to the need for industry analysts to create an audience for 
whom they are expert (Turner 2001). In other words, we see industry analysts exemplifying a 
different kind of expert to the established groups that Sociology of Professions has tended to 
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focus upon which have already achieved wide acceptance of the efficacy of the knowledge base 
and methods. This exigency pervades much of their activities.   
Gartner as a decision-support company 
Gideon Gartner, in establishing the first industry analyst organisation, set out to create a 
‘decision-support company’. Its staff are encouraged to demonstrate the value of their 
knowledge outputs and advisory services in helping its customers (technology adopters, 
vendors, investors) make practical choices (interview, Gideon Gartner). This goal shapes the 
ways in which they produce and apply knowledge. In developing this distinctive form of industry 
analyst expertise, we can see a number of strategic choices that drew upon but also 
differentiated from a variety of available models. Perhaps unusually the thinking behind these 
choices has been widely and explicitly discussed in blogs and public interviews as well as 
through our research interviews. 
Quantitative Market Studies 
In establishing his firm Gideon Gartner decided to move away from one established model – of 
conventional (e.g. market) research, that applied large scale quantitative techniques to capture 
the current market and existing trends. The earliest players in the emerging market for IT 
research were publishers of databases and technical reviews of product markets and 
quantitative market surveys such as Computer Intelligence, International Data Corporation (IDC) 
and Yankee (Bernard & Gallupe 2013) established in the 1960s and 1970s. Ovum, established 
in 1985 as a publishing house, exemplifies this relatively traditional model of large-scale market 
research into technology sectors. An exhaustive research process, involving interviews with 
large numbers of vendors and adopters, produces an extensive database, which is then used to 
generate specialist reports. The upfront costs of collecting and processing this information are 
very high. The reports therefore need to be heavily marketed (and they can be very profitable if 
sufficient sales can be achieved). David Mitchell, Research Director at Ovum, told us “In my 
firm, IP [Intellectual Property] is the main product” (interview, Mitchell). Ovum’s business model 
involves achieving economies of scope and scale and generating “reproducible IP”.  
Though these large-scale quantitative research methods are effective at consistently and 
reliably summarising existing patterns and established trends, for example growth in markets 
and market share, these kinds of method are arguably less effective in identifying the possibility 
of shifts in existing paradigms and trajectories.  
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From market research to decision-support 
Gideon Gartner conceived a different kind of knowledge service – produced by a rather different 
research process. Speaking publicly about the origins of Gartner Inc. he notes: “our idea was to 
go way beyond market research; to really help people in their decision making, to be much more 
strategic…to be a decision-support company” (Gartner 2007). Thus, Gideon Gartner (2011c) 
exhorted his analysts to “advocate positions explicitly, improve abilities to sell a specific point of 
view”. As part of a strategy to establish an advisory firm that could help clients make decisions, 
Gideon Gartner evolved new kinds of research tools and methods - honed to detect changes in 
existing market trends – and new kinds of knowledge output. Knowledge produced by analysts 
needed to pass a “so what?” test. Rather than producing long technical reports, new formats 
were developed that could convey findings rapidly, and could form the starting point for advisory 
services. 
The research process that Gideon Gartner proposed was in part inspired by contemporary 
efforts to apply ideas from decision theory to business practice – in investment analysis, 
marketing and company strategic planning – which suggested the need to go beyond such 
quantitative methods which, in his view, could simply encourage “herd behaviour”. Gideon 
Gartner drew on the work of decision theory scholars Montgomery and Weinberg who note: 
“The problem is not to generate data, but to determine what information is relevant and 
actionable” (Montgomery and Weinberg 1979: 44). Gideon Gartner concluded from this work 
that “evidence to support research conclusions was often abundantly available, and should be 
tapped” (Gartner 2011). Drawing explicitly upon Montgomery and Weinberg’s concept of 
Strategic Intelligence Systems, which applies decision theory to the domain of Marketing, 
Gideon Gartner’s approach seems designed to foster sensitivity to shifts in sentiment across the 
analyst’s network that could signal possible changes in the technology landscape. In this 
context, Gideon Gartner developed the idea of The Stalking Horse, as the basis for what a 
former colleague, Richard Stiennon, described as “thought experiments that would spark 
innovative thinking” (CIO 2012). The goal here was to generate “original and provocative 
conclusions” (Gartner 2011a) rather than, for example, to reinforce existing consensus. The 
approach seems honed to picking up early signals amongst its network of vendor and client 
contacts and in particular, to provoke responses and thereby detect changes in existing 
trajectories and patterns. As Elias Thomas  told us, “We are deliberately taught to provoke; to 
push things too far to get people to react. I can think of lots of examples where…provoking 
vendors and clients is part of the game as far as an analyst is concerned, in order to get to the 
truth” (interview, Thomas). The key objective seems to be to tap into particular kinds of 
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knowledge shift – emergent understandings and insights which may be driven by client 
concerns or by particular successful initiatives – that may change existing taken-for-granted 
knowledge. This is not a matter of anticipating or predicting the future. Thus Elias Thomas   
describes how as Gartner analysts “we react to success. If it succeeds and other vendors start 
piling in, we go ‘right. Something is going on there’ and we go after it” (interview, Thomas). 
In this respect, their pronouncements tend to be fairly conservative; they are “fast followers not 
leaders” (interview, Thomas). Gartner’s knowledge processes were thus designed and continue 
to be explicitly geared to generating particular kinds of knowledge.  
In thinking about the possibility of establishing a market for this novel form of expertise, Gideon 
Gartner drew perhaps most immediately upon his ongoing experience and links in Wall Street. 
Rather paradoxically, this influence is not always commented upon in discussion of the industry 
analyst role. However his previous career in a financial analyst firm, pervades Gideon Gartner’s 
thinking. Along with ideas about Marketing, these provided a taken-for-granted template. Thus, 
in considering how industry analysts would allocate their time between functions (and the scope 
to allocate their time more profitably), Gideon Gartner takes as a starting point the rough 
breakdown of a “Wall street analyst” time. Likewise Gartner’s decision to employ “senior 
industry people, who were in fact ‘peers’ of their prospective clients” appears to have been 
taken from Wall Street practice.   
Financial analysts – also known as investment, security or equity analysts – comprise an 
established group. The market for technology investment advice has been around for more than 
a century (Preda 2009). They have been subject to enquiry from a range of perspectives – 
including econometric studies of their effectiveness as well as more recent sociological 
explorations of how they were formed (ibid.) and how they operate. The former has for example 
looked at the limited evidence of efficacy of financial advice (Cowles 1933), while noting a bias 
in their advice which tends to over-estimate growth possibilities and underestimate risks 
(Wansleben 2012) – a failing that has been attributed variously to: their resort to imitating their 
peers (Rao et al 2001); their personal economic interests; and, experience that as well as 
rewarding accuracy of earnings forecasts, positive assessments will enhance their promotion 
prospects (Hong & Kubik 2003).4 Most notably (sell-side) security analysts, in producing 
forecasts of a firm’s future earnings, develop calculative frames to assess how corporate  
performance is assessed. Our research (Author Study 2011) suggests that industry analysts 
may act in a manner akin to security analysts to construct the categories through which the 
potential of companies are assessed (Zuckerman 1999, Beunza & Garud 2007, Wansleben 
2012). This and related ideas from the Sociology of Finance also provides some points of 
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comparison and contribute to a more generic understanding of how these forms of expertise 
operate as epistemic systems – of knowledge production and consumption. Thus Knorr Cetina 
(2010) has observed how financial analysts draw not only upon formal information but also on 
direct contacts and site visits (which she characterises as ‘mini-ethnographies’) to ‘see through’ 
performance claims (Ibid. 189). Knorr Cetina (2010, 2012) also shares an interest with us in 
exploring the temporality of the worlds to which analyst knowledge pertains. The financial 
analysts Knorr Cetina studied operate in a world of investment and speculation in which 
assessments of future stock values are perennially vulnerable to events. In such contexts, she 
argues, “truth takes second place to news and rumor” (Knorr Cetina 2010: 190); in this context 
the accuracy of a financial prediction “seemingly does not matter all that much” (ibid: 182).  
However it is instructive to explore the different temporalities of knowledge and the worlds to 
which they pertain. Knorr Cetina (2010) contrasts the constantly changing ground of financial 
analysis data with the stability of the worlds that are the subject of natural science - hence the 
rather long-lived character of scientific theories and methods. Our industry analysts perhaps 
represent a mid-point between natural science and financial analysis. They also are seeking to 
demonstrate mastery and cognitive authority over ephemeral promising technology fields  - 
domains which are constantly shifting as a result of changes in technology and business 
processes. This was one of the factors undermining the scope to codify industry analyst 
knowledge into a generic form that could be exploited in classic professionalisation strategies - 
as described above.  
Journalists  
Another model that may be pertinent to our enquiry is that of the journalist. Gartner has recently 
established an Office of the Gartner Ombudsman. This idea was explicitly lifted from the media 
rather than public administration. Nancy Erskine, Gartner Ombudsman told us: “We modelled 
ourselves initially on the news media and the kind of the voice of the reader, so to speak, more 
than Government or internal or HR oriented ombuds-people” (interview, Erskine). Their decision 
to create the Office of the Gartner Ombudsman was motivated “to instantiate the independence 
and objectivity of Gartner” (interview, Erskine) and it became a brand differentiator for Gartner 
Inc. 
Journalists as professionals deploy an occupational ideology that emphasises ‘integrity’ and 
‘objectivity’ (Aldridge & Evetts 2003). Though the latter term incorporates multiple meanings, the 
main claim advanced is that good journalism is the disinterested search for, and weighing of, 
evidence. The ‘good journalist’ provides balanced and transparent access to the best 
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informed/most authentic sources (ibid). There are some obvious parallels with the industry 
analyst role. Indeed, as we have already noted, one of the precursors for industry analysis 
comprised publishers of technical and market reviews. The industry analyst expert as conceived 
by Gideon Gartner, perhaps like journalists, deploy a wide range of contacts in searching for 
information but also, more like traditional technical experts: i) deploy specialised techniques to 
bring this knowledge together in consistent ways; and ii) possess the significant body of 
expertise needed to make complex judgements. In emphasising their impartiality, several of the 
Gartner analysts we interviewed portrayed themselves as the Which? magazine for the sector 
(see Aldridge [1994] for a discussion of this magazine). They also noted ways in which they 
were not like Which? magazine – particularly in responding to clients’ calls and providing 
personalised advice. Gartner’s Elias Thomas argues that what distinguishes analysts from 
journalists is their “focus and persistence”: journalists will shift their attention according to what 
topics are hot and newsworthy; they will “learn enough about it and then find a story, write a 
story…so they are constantly flitting around” (interview, Thomas). Gartner’s critics make a rather 
different comparison, pointing out that whilst newspapers and other commercial media make 
money from advertising, “not every entity [they] report on is a potential revenue source. Over at 
Gartner, however, every entity they report on is either a current or a potential revenue source” 
(Snapp 2013: 41-2). 
Management consultants  
Another obviously relevant example that we have already explored is management consultancy. 
Here the failure of management specialists to conform to the traditional professional model had 
been attributed by writers from the Sociology of Professions to the success of large firms in 
deploying a broad range of requisite expertise and in managing interdisciplinary teams. The 
strong brand identities of these big consultancies provided both a proxy indicator of past 
performance and presumed guarantor of future performance (Abbott 1988, Muzio et al. 2011). 
The big firms did not have a need for professional status (Groß & Kieser 2006). Nor, it seems, 
did industry analysts. There was an attempt to establish professional structures for industry 
analysts but this was opposed by Gartner. As one experienced analyst, Collins, told us:  
Why would Gartner ‘allow it’? A professional body is actually a...restricting mechanism. I 
think they [Gartner] are probably quite happy to make their own decisions as opposed to 
feel incumbent on other people for a code of conduct or whatever” (interview, Collins).  
However, the distinctive model of industry analyst expertise established by Gideon Gartner was 
rather different from the existing management consultancy firms. Gartner Inc. resembles the big 
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management consultancies in terms of the reputational role of corporate brand. However 
Gartner analysts distinguish themselves from consultants: they portray consultants as on the 
one hand as consumers of their research, and in particular see them as dependent upon 
particular consultancy contracts. Gartner analysts in contrast repeatedly and strenuously 
emphasise their independence which lay at the very core of the business for large analyst 
organisations, rooted in their large client base and in particular on their subscription based 
services (e.g. for technical reports and advisory services) provided to large numbers of 
organisations.  
Gartner exercise cognitive authority over emerging technical fields 
The cognitive authority that Gartner sought and achieved was rooted not just in the efficacy of 
their advice for particular clients – but their ability to exercise authority over a whole technical 
field. Over time Gartner have evolved a wide range of knowledge products offering both 
comparative assessment and predictions about developments across whole fields. Foremost 
here is its ‘signature’ output the Magic Quadrant that ranks and assesses the relative strengths 
of vendors in established product markets (Author Study 2009). The Magic Quadrant positions 
the main vendors in a field along two dimensions: a vendor’s ‘completeness of vision’ and it’s 
‘ability to execute’ on that vision. Gartner has also developed a range of tools for engaging with 
emergent  technology fields (MarketScopes, Cool Vendor Lists) and for tracking the evolution of 
fields up to their eventual closure (Hype-Cycles; IT Market Clocks). Gartner’s pronouncements, 
though often controversial, are highly influential. A vendors omission from, or poor position on, a 
Magic Quadrant can dramatically affect their market prospects (Author Study 2009). Their 
assessments help shape both the procurement choices of adopters and vendors’ development 
strategies. Gartner also developed elaborate mechanisms to maintain, and visibly demonstrate, 
corporate regulation of quality and independence of research. And here we saw how they drew 
some elements from the scientific model of expertise (e.g. the appointment of an ombudsman, 
elaboration of formal methodologies and internal peer review of findings).  
 
Conclusions 
It would appear that the recently emerged role of IT industry analyst offering advisory services 
drew elements from a number of domains of practice, including conventional quantitative and 
market research, academic scientific research as well as others including journalism, financial 
analysis and marketing.  
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The Sociology of Professions has provided a stimulating conceptual framework for our enquiry. 
However, its early writings drew rather narrowly on traditional (medical, legal, scientific) 
examples and offered rather static analyses that focused upon social control mechanisms and 
jurisdictional conflicts. In the course of the paper we have however moved away from those 
approaches that paradoxically paid relatively little attention to the content of professional work 
and knowledge. Our analysis instead focuses in detail upon the content of expert knowledge, 
how it is generated (Preda 2009), and how it achieves cognitive authority (Turner 2001, Muzio el 
al 2011) through an array of interactions amongst diverse actors (Anderson-Gough et al. 2006). 
The challenge is to examine the detailed work of particular expert groups, how their knowledge 
work takes place through and is shaped by (and helps constitute) these networks of interaction. 
Here there has been an interesting convergence between a ‘third wave’ of scholarship in the 
Sociology of Professions and scholars from Science and Technology Studies who have 
addressed the epistemic systems underpinning markets. 
The category of industry analyst, whose emergence we document here, is neither uniform nor 
static. We note that industry analysts must tackle homologous challenges to traditional technical 
expert groups. The ways in which they organise and regulate their processes of knowledge 
production resemble, and indeed explicitly draw upon, some elements of the established 
medical/scientific expertise model. They also differ in a number of important ways. In particular, 
it seems that industry analysts do not need professional associations to validate their 
knowledge. Instead, reputational indicators and above all the brand of the analyst organisation 
becomes a key proxy for quality of expertise (the quality of the staff the firm employs, the rigour 
of the methodologies they deploy, and ‘coins of the realm’ like the Magic Quadrant). In this 
respect, industry analysts exhibit some similarities with another, already well-established group 
deploying business knowledge: management consultants. However, there are differences. 
Gartner’s assessments may have crucial consequences for suppliers and adopters. They 
therefore need to be able to defend their claims. As a result, the knowledge outputs of Gartner 
analysts have become increasingly subject to standardised methodologies and to internal 
review mechanisms. These bear some resemblance to academic review systems. It is notable, 
however that analysts themselves characterise their work as similar to but different from 
science: as pseudo-academic involving a ‘truth element’. Review also remains internal to the 
analyst organisation: we do not find the external peer review or scrutiny by a certificating 
professional body that characterises traditional professional communities. The importance 
attached by Gartner Inc. to the quality and independence of their assessments is also reflected 
in their recent appointment of an Ombudsman. 
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We traced this back to the distinctive model of industry analyst expertise articulated by Gideon 
Gartner. This “hodgepodge of ideas” (Gartner 2010b) gradually took shape over the first decade 
of Gartner Inc. and provided a template for large industry analyst organisations. This was in 
terms of both the kinds of knowledge produced and the manner in which it is generated, 
validated and applied; 
i) Gartner sought to offer value to its customers by being a ‘decision-support’ rather than market 
research company; its outputs had to pass a ‘so what’ test. Methodologies like the ‘Stalking 
Horse’ seemed honed to help analysts detect early signals, patterns and shifts amongst their 
client network;  
ii) At the same time Gartner’s assessments needed to be credible, independent and defensible 
– produced in recent decades through increasingly formalised methodologies and subject to 
internal review and governance systems including the Office of the Gartner Ombudsman 
(through which they distinguish themselves from management consultants); 
iii) Whereas some market research organisations instituted a detailed division of labour and 
skills (e.g. between lower grade data collection staff; statistical analysts; experts) Gartner 
wanted its analysts to combine advisory activities with research in the course of their 
engagements with technology vendors and users, and therefore appointed highly expert staff 
who were peers of those they were dealing with. 
iv) Gartner Inc. over time has elaborated a plethora of forms of knowledge outputs that address 
emergent as well as established technical fields. Through a flood of research outputs we see a 
struggle to maintain cognitive authority over the commanding heights of the IT market – 
including more decisive ‘naming interventions’ and the production of Magic Quadrants.  
In these respects, industry analyst knowledge outputs – their published assessments of the 
development of particular IT markets and the relative performances of the main providers – 
significantly influence evolving technical fields. Their outputs exhibit certain ‘public good’ 
elements and would appear consonant with Porter’s (1992: 640) description of accountants as 
producers of public knowledge able to “coordinate the activities of diverse actors, and to lend 
credibility to forms of belief and action when personal trust is in short supply”. 
We see this work as contributing to a renewal of scholarship on professions. However research 
needs to go beyond the historical focus of Sociology of Professions on professional institutions 
and boundary work and embrace the arguments of a ‘third wave’ of scholars within this tradition, 
from the Sociology of Expertise and from the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge concerning the 
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need for a detailed focus on the content of expert work, its practices and knowledge. Our 
analysis of knowledge intermediaries such as industry analysts and financial analysts has 
highlighted the production, validation and consumption of their knowledge, including the 
particular data analysis and presentation devices deployed, conceived as epistemic systems 
(Knorr-Cetina 2010, 2012). 
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1 Brante (1988) makes the telling observation that, though this ‘neoWeberian’ perspective inverts the traditional functionalist model, both templates effectively reproduce the professional 
ideology of expert groups. Professional activities are not (allegedly) governed by self-interest, but by a body of objective and scientific knowledge which is used to inform decision and 
intervention carried out for the public good (Fournier 2000: 76). 
2 There have however been attempts in some countries (e.g. Germany) to require certification of business consultants (Groß & Kieser 2006). Intriguingly financial/securities analysts have been 
regulated, notably by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission established in 1935 after financial crises were attributed to unrealistic over-valuation of stocks (Wansleben 2012). The 
requirement for certification of “sell-side” analysts, who in the US must be members of the Institute of Certified Financial Analysts, has underpinned some elements of professionalisation in the 
field. Industry analysts, management consultants and other domains of business knowledge have remained a matter for the market to resolve. 
3 Turner’s (2001) typology also identifies a second group of experts whose authority has been accepted by a pre-determined restricted audience. These Type 2 experts are exemplified by the 
cognitive authority of the theologian which extends only to the specific audience of a religious sect.  
4 Gartner Inc. has similarly been criticized for a generic bias towards IT solutions and a specific bias (rooted in its complex procedures for engaging vendors) towards larger vendors (Snapp 
2013). 
